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INTRODUCTION
If the mark of a seminal study is the quantity and quality of the progeny it
spawns, then Robert A. Dahl's Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker,1 scores a bull's eye. From its
publication, the Dahl Article has been cited by both social science journals and
2law reviews every year to date. Even more important is the high quality and
diversity of scholarship building on Professor Dahl's study, from research
assessing the relationship between public opinion and the U.S. Supreme
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1 Robert A. Dahi, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policymaker, 6
J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) ("Decision-Making in a Democracy").
2 We discovered this via electronic searches of various databases in LEXIS-NEXIS, J-Stor, and OCLC.
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Court,3 to the role the Justices play in facilitating partisan realignments,4 to the
Court's capacity to generate social change.5
No one essay could consider the debt scholars writing in these and other
areas owe to Decision-Making in a Democracy.6  Further, we do not try.
Instead, we focus on Dahl's resolution of the "countermajoritarian difficulty," 7
a term Alexander Bickel coined to reflect the "problem" of allowing unelected
judges to strike down legislation passed by elected representatives.8 On Dahl's
account, we need not worry too much about this "difficulty" because the
"policy views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with the
policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United States." 9
This coincidence of preferences comes about, according to Dahl, because the
ruling regime (i.e., the president and the Senate) has the opportunity to appoint
new Justices to the Court about every two years.' 0 Those new Justices, in turn,
vote in accord with their sincere political preferences-or so Dahl assumes-
which would coincide with the views of those who appointed them.
We argue that Dahl was right to discount the seriousness of the "difficulty"
but not primarily for the reason he suggested. Rather than focusing on a
correspondence of preferences among the different branches of government,
we base our argument on the effects of the separation of powers system on the
3 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCi. 635 (1992); Robert H. Durr et al., Ideological Divergence and Public Support for
the Supreme Court, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 768 (2000); James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Blacks and the
United States Supreme Court: Models of Diffuse Support, 54 J. POL. 1120 (1992); Timothy R. Johnson &
Andrew D. Martin, The Public's Conditional Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. Sc. REV.
299 (1998); William Mishler & Reginald Sheehan, Public Opinion, the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court
Decision Making: A Micro-Analytic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 169 (1996); James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic
Representation, 89 AM. POL. Sa. REV. 543 (1995).
4 See, e.g., JOHN B. GATES, THE SUPREME COURT AND PARTISAN REALIGNMENT: A MACRO- AND
MICROLEVEL PERSPECTIVE (1992); David Adamany, Legitimacy, Realigning Elections, and the Supreme
Court, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 790; Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SC.
REV. 795 (1975); John B. Gates, Partisan Realignment, Unconstitutional State Policies, and the U.S. Supreme
Court, 1837-1964, 31 AM J. POL. Sci. 259 (1987); William Lasser, The Supreme Court in Periods of Critical
Realignment, 47 J. POL. 1174 (1985).
5 See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HoLLOw HOPE (1991); Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme
Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 50 (1976).
6 Dahli, supra note 1.
7 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16 (1962).
8 See Barry Friedman, The History ofthe Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 971, 984 (2000).
9 Dahl, supra note 1, at 285.
10 Id. at 284.
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strategic choices of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. We argue that, given the
institutional constraints imposed on the Court, the Justices cannot effectuate
their own policy and institutional goals without taking account of the goals and
likely actions of the members of the other branches. When they are attentive to
external actors, Justices find that the best way to have a long-term effect on the
nature and content of the law is to adapt their decisions to the preferences of
these others. In this sense, the resolution of the "countermajoritarian
difficulty" rests in an important effect of the separation of powers system: a
strategic incentive to anticipate and then react to the preferences of elected
officials.
We develop this argument in four steps. We begin with a discussion of
Dahl's "ruling regime" thesis and explore a key assumption under which it
operates-that judicial decisions are a direct function of the sincerely held
attitudes of the Justices. We then lay out our argument, which is attentive to
the strategic context in which Justices labor. In Part InI, we assess several
observable implications both of Dahl's and our accounts and weigh them
against data derived from constitutional civil rights cases. Finally, we take
stock of our results and discuss their bearing on the "countermajoritarian
difficulty."
I. DAHL'S RESOLUTION OF THE "COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY"
To say that Marbury v. Madison1' has generated more commentary than
most U.S. Supreme Court decisions is to make a rather uncontroversial claim.
Judges, presidents, and scholars alike have picked apart virtually every aspect
of Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion. The commentary ranges from
whether the Court, once it found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
case, 2 should have decided it at all to whether section 13 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, which the Justices declared unconstitutional in Marbury, actually
expanded the Court's original jurisdiction. 13
11 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
12 See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERON, VOL XV 447 (Andrew A.
Lipscomb ed., 1905) (complaining that, in Marbury v. Madison, "[tihe Court determined at once, that being an
original process, they had no cognizance of it; and therefore the question before them was ended. But the
Chief Justice went on to lay down what the law would be, had they jurisdiction of the case .... ").
13 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrruDINAL
MODEL (1993) (stating that the Act did not, in fact, expand the Court's jurisdiction, thus leaving Justice
Marshall with "nothing to declare unconstitutional").
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Other debates center less on the particulars of the Marbury opinion and
more on its larger implications for the Court's role in a democratic society.
The most relevant of these debates for Dahl's and our purposes draws attention
to Bickel's "countermajoritarian difficulty" argument.14  Given America's
fundamental commitment to a representative form of government, why should
its citizens allow a group of unelected officials-namely, federal judges-to
override the wishes of the people, as expressed by their elected officials?
Dahl addressed this question via his "ruling regime" thesis. At the core of
his argument is the assertion that the political preferences of Supreme Court
Justices never will be substantially out-of-line with those of the existing law-
making majorities. Accordingly, the Justices' decisions usually will be
consistent with the preferences of the elected branches. The primary reason for
this, according to Dahl, is quite simple: on average, presidents have the
opportunity to appoint two new Justices during the course of a four-year
term.15 Because presidents usually nominate Justices with philosophies similar
to their own and the Senate generally confirms only nominees who have views
consistent with the contemporary political mainstream, regular turnover results
in a Court majority rarely holding significantly divergent political preferences
from those held by the president and Congress. That is why, as Dahl explains,
the Court will not often strike down federal legislation.1 6 Such laws reflect the
positions of members of Congress, the president, and-by virtue of the
regularity and nature of the appointment process-the Justices as well. Under
this logic, the Court almost never assumes an antimajoritarian role; rather, it
typically will represent and, therefore, legitimize the interests of the ruling
regime.
The data Dahl used seem to support his argument. 17  They show that
between the 1780s and the 1950s the Court struck down relatively few federal
laws and, when the Court did strike down a federal law, the action tended to
come more than four years after the passage of the law. According to Dahl,
this indicates that the Court is much more likely to strike down legislation
passed by congressional majorities that are no longer in power than it is to void
the acts of current legislative majorities.'8 By nullifying "old" laws, the Court
14 BICKEL, supra note 7, at 16.
15 Dahl, supra note 1, at 284.
16 Id. at 285.
17 We stress "seem" because the data Dahl invoked demonstrate that the ruling regime thesis may work,
but the data do not demonstrate the mechanism by which this adaptation takes place.
18 Dahl, supra note 1, at 286-87.
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may be reflecting the will of the new political majority that no longer desires
the legislation enacted by earlier lawmakers.
Dahl thus renders moot the normative debate over what the role of the
Court should be in a democratic society. Further, under Dahl's theory, analysts
no longer need worry about whether the Court should or should not act as a
countermajoritarian body because it will almost never take on this role.
Rather, the Court typically will represent and ultimately legitimize the interests
of the ruling regime.
A. The Role of Political Preferences in Dahl's Account
By Dahl's account, the nomination/confirmation process guarantees that
the Court will operate as a majoritarian institution, thus reflecting prevailing
political preferences.' 9  Embedded in this claim, however, is a critical
assumption Dahl makes about the nature of Supreme Court decisionmaking;
namely, judicial decisions are a function of the sincerely held political
preferences of the Justices. If the Court legitimizes the policies of the other
branches of government, it is not, on Dahl's account, because they have made
an a priori decision to do so; rather their behavior is merely a by-product of
their ideologies. In other words, the Court tends to reinforce prevailing
political majorities because (1) the selection process is biased in favor of
choosing Justices who have political preferences consistent with those of
incumbent presidents and legislators, and (2) those Justices vote in accord with
their sincere preferences, which, again, coincide with those of the ruling
regime.
It is not surprising that Dahl assumed that the Court would engage in
"sincere" behavior. Dali was writing at a time when the behavioralism
movement of the 1950s, a movement of enormous influence, had taken hold in
political science. That movement influenced the study of Court decisions
through the use of the so-called "attitudinal model," which holds that Justices
base their decisions solely on the facts of cases vis-A-vis their ideological
attitudes and values. Or, as two leading proponents of the model put it,
"Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative;
'9 Id. at 284-85.
20 For more on the development of the attitudinal model, see SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 13, at 64-73;
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, a Look Ahead,
53 POL. RES. Q. 625 (2000).
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Marshall voted the way he did because he is extremely liberal."21 Based on the
attitudinal model, no factors other than ideology come into play; Rehnquist
will take the conservative position and Marshall will take the liberal one,
regardless of where Congress or the president stand on a particular issue.
It is just this attitudinal assumption about the way Justices behave that, to
reiterate, undergirds Dahl's ruling regime thesis. The president and Senate will
appoint Justices who reflect their ideologies; those Justices, in turn, will vote in
line with their own ideologies-which happen to be the same as the President's
and the Senate's-thereby legitimizing the interests of the ruling regime.
B. Implications of Dahl's Adoption of the Assumption of Sincere Behavior
To consider the implications of Dahl's adoption of the assumption that
Justices will vote in accord with their sincerely held political preferences, we
offer Figures la and lb, below.22  In each, we depict a hypothetical set of
preferences over a particular policy, here a civil rights statute. The horizontal
lines represent civil rights policy spaces ordered from left (most "liberal") to
right (most "conservative"); the vertical lines show the preferences (the "most
preferred positions") of the relevant actors: the president, the median member
of the Court, of Congress, and of the key committees and other legislation
gatekeepers in Congress.23 Note that we also identify the committees'
indifference point (denoted with an asterisk) "where the Court can set policy
which the committee likes no more and no less than the opposite policy that
could be chosen by the full chamber."24  To put it another way, because the
21 SEGAL& SPAETH, supra note 13, at 65.
22 we adapt these figures from William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L. REv. 331 (1991); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on
History?: Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991).
23 In denoting these most preferred points, we assume that the actors prefer an outcome that is nearer to
that point than one that is further away. Or, to put it more technically, '"beginning at [an actor's] ideal point,
utility always declines monotonically in any direction. This . . . is known as single-peakedness of
preferences." Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13 LEGis. STUD. Q. 259,263 (1988). We
also assume that the actors possess complete and perfect information about the preferences of all other actors
and that the sequence of policy making enfolds as follows: the Court interprets a law, the relevant
congressional committees propose (or do not propose) legislation to override the Court's interpretation,
Congress (if the committees propose legislation) enacts (or does not enact) an override bill, the President (if
Congress acts) signs (or does not sign) the override bill, and Congress (if the President vetoes) overrides (or
does not override) the veto. These are relatively common assumptions in the legal literature. See, e.g.,
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 22, at 378; Eskridge,
Reneging on History?: Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, supra note 22; see also
Figure 2, infra p. 593.
24 Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 22, at 378.
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indifference point and the median member of Congress are equidistant from
the committees, the committees like the indifference points as much as they
like the most preferred position of Congress; they are indifferent between the
two.
Figure 1. Hypothetical Distribution of Preferences
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As we can see, in Figure lb the Court is to the left of Congress, the key
committees, and the president. This means, in this illustration, that the Court
favors more liberal policy than the other political branches. In Figure la, the
Court also is to the left of the relevant actors but, note, the committees'
indifference point is on the Court's most preferred position.
Now suppose that the Court has a civil rights case before it, one involving
the claim of a black woman that her employer has refused to promote her
because of her race and sex. How would the Court decide this case? Under
Dahl's approach, the Justices would vote exactly the position shown on the
line; they would vote their sincere "attitudes." Based on Figure la there would
be no adverse congressional reaction to the Court's vote. If the Court votes in
line with its preferences (which are comparatively liberal) and sets the policy
at its most preferred position, then the relevant congressional committees
would have no incentive to override the Court because the congressional
committees' indifference point is the same as the Court's most preferred
position. Therefore, they would be indifferent to the policy preferred by the
Court. The configuration of preferences-a Court that is relatively close,
ideologically speaking, to the ruling regime or close enough to vote in line
with its sincere preferences without fear of provoking Congress-displayed in
Figure la, would be common under Dahl's thesis. After all, if Dahl is correct
and the president nominated and the Senate confirmed some fraction of its
members, we would not expect the Court to be all that far from the appointing
actors. Moreover, the outcome of the Court's decision-an interpretation
acceptable to the "ruling regime"--also falls well in line with Dahl's approach.
Figure lb is less likely, but not impossible under Dahl's theory. In Figure
lb, we see a Court that, if it votes sincerely, would know the threat of
congressional reaction looms large. That is because the policy articulated by
the attitudinally-driven Court would be to the left of the indifference point of
the relevant committees, giving them every incentive to introduce legislation
lying at their preferred point. Congress would support such legislation because
it would prefer the committees' preferred policy to the Court's. Further, the
President would sign the legislation as he also prefers the position of the
committee over that of the Court.
Given this situation, would the lb Court interpret the statute differently
than the la Court? Not under Dahl's account. Because the Justices vote their
attitudes without regard to the other pertinent players in the interaction, this
Court, like the la Court would interpret the statute in line with its preferences;
[Vol. 50
2001] THE SUPREME COURT AS A STRATEGIC NATIONAL POLICYMAKER 591
that Congress might override its interpretation is not relevant under the
attitudinal assumption.
If the Justices risked congressional reversal and merely voted their
sincerely held preferences, as Dahl assumes, they would be (at least in this
example) supporting an outcome that went against the interests of dominant
regime. Under Dahl's theory, this can certainly happen. It is possible that the
Court would be temporarily out of step with the majoritarian institutions
because of some anomaly-such as an unusually long period of time without a
presidential appointment to the Court, a realigning election, and so forth. In
such a situation, Dahl might argue, the Justices will continue to vote their
attitudes, fully aware that Congress could and probably would reverse the
majority's position. In time, however, the periodic replacement of Justices
would bring the Court back in line with the elected branches.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL RESOLUTION
TO THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN PROBLEM
A natural question emerges from our discussion of Dahl's account: Why
would the lb Court take a position that Congress would overturn? The answer,
again, is simple: Under Dahl's assumption of sincere behavior, Justices are
"single-minded seekers of legal policy" 5 whose ideology dictates their votes.
Justices are presented with legal questions about which they have attitudes.
Those attitudes, in turn, dictate an automatic behavior-the vote.
Our claim is that this perspective often fails to capture the realities of
Supreme Court decisionmaking and, accordingly, of the Court's role in
American society. If Justices are "single-minded seekers of legal policy,"
would those Justices not care about the ultimate state of that policy? To
rephrase the question, why would Justices who are policy-preference
maximizers take a position they know Congress would overturn? To argue
that Justices merely vote their attitudes is to argue that the Court is full of
myopic thinkers who consider only the shape of policy in the short term. Such
an argument does not square with important analysis of the Court26 or with the
way many social scientists now believe that political actors make decisions.
25 Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 323 (1992).
26 See, e.g., WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Eskridge, Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 22; J. Woodford Howard, On the Fluidity of
Judicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 43 (1968); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May It Please the
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We reject this attitudinal vision and propose a strategic one instead. The
strategic approach, as we set it out,27 starts off with the same premise as that of
the attitudinal school: Justices are "single-minded seekers of legal policy.
28
From there, however, the two approaches diverge dramatically. The strategic
approach assumes that if the Justices truly care about the ultimate state of the
law, then they must-as Charles Fairman once put it-"keep [their] watch in
the halls of Congress" 29 and, occasionally, in the oval office of the White
House. Additionally, they must pay heed to the various institutions structuring
their interactions with these external actors. They cannot, as the attitudinalists
and Dahl suggest, simply vote their own ideological preferences as if they are
operating in a vacuum; they must instead be attentive to the preferences of the
other institutions and the actions they expect them to take if they want to
generate enduring policy.
This claim flows from the logic of an institution underlying the U.S.
Constitution, the separation of powers system. That system, along with
informal rules that have evolved over time (such as the power of judicial
review), endows each branch of government with significant powers and
authority over its sphere. At the same time, it provides explicit checks on the
exercise of those powers such that each branch can impose limits on the
primary functions of the others. So, for example and as Figure 2 shows, the
judiciary may interpret the law and even strike down laws as being in violation
of the Constitution, but Congress can pass new legislation, which the President
may choose to sign or veto.
Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 421 (1996); Forrest Maltzman & Paul
J. Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 Am. POL. Sci. REV.
581 (1996). For a review of some of this literature, see Epstein & Knight, supra note 20.
27 Our theory makes the assumption that Justices primarily pursue policy goals. We are not alone. Many
strategic accounts of judicial decisions assume that the goal of most Justices is to see the law reflect their most
preferred policy positions. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, TIE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998);
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 22; Eskridge, Reneging on
History?: Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, supra note 22; Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael
Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-
Relation Decisions, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992). But this need not be the case. Under the strategic theory,
actors-including Justices-can be, in principle, motivated by many things. As long as the ability of a Justice
to achieve his or her goal is contingent on the actions of others (as supposed by the strategic theory), his or her
decision is interdependent and strategic. For an example of a strategic account of judicial decisions in which
Justices are motivated by jurisprudential principles, see John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, A Positive Theory of
Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 263 (1992); for a strategic account in which institutional
goals figure prominently, see Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, 30 L. &
Soc. REv. 87 (1996).
28 See supra note 25.
29 CHARLES FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 (1987).
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Figure 2. The Separation of Powers System in Action
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Seen in this way, the rule of checks and balances inherent in the system of
separation of powers provides Justices (and all other governmental actors) with
10 We adapt this figure from Eskridge, Reneging on History?: Playing the Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, supra note 22, at 644.
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important information: policy in the United States emanates not from the
separate actions of the branches of government but from the interaction among
them. Thus, it follows that for any set of actors to make authoritative policy-
be they Justices, legislators, or executives-they must take into account this
institutional constraint by formulating expectations about the preferences of the
other relevant actors and what they expect them to do when making their own
choices.
A. Implications of the Strategic Account of Judicial Decisions
To see the implications of the strategic argument, return to Figure lb
above. Given the distribution of the most preferred positions of the actors in
this figure, strategic Justices-unlike those Dahl depicts-would not be willing
to risk voting their sincere preferences. Instead, they would see that Congress
could easily override their position and that the president would support
Congress. In this instance the rational course of action-the best choice for
Justices interested in policy-is to place policy near the committees'
indifference point. The reason is easy to see: Because the committees are
indifferent between that point and the most preferred position of the median
member of Congress, they have no incentive to introduce legislation to
overturn a policy. Thus, the Court would end up with a policy close to, but not
exactly on, its ideal point without risking congressional reaction.
Accordingly, the strategic argument has an important implication for
empirical and normative debates over the role of the Court in American
society. It suggests that the Court will not often be significantly out of step
with the other branches, but for reasons different than those offered by Dahl.
Recall that Dahl argues that the Court will rarely strike down congressional
legislation because the majority of the Court, the median member of Congress,
and the president generally share the same values. We argue, in contrast, that
because the separation of powers system requires Justices, who are interested
in affecting the nature of the law, to take into account the preferences of the
ruling regime, the Court's decisions typically will never be that far removed
from what other relevant contemporaneous actors desire.
This does not mean, however, that the Court can never vote its sincere
preferences. Figure la shows how this could occur. Given the displayed
distribution of preferences, the Court would be free to set policy in a way that
reflects its raw preferences. If the Court voted its preferences (which are
comparatively liberal) and set policy based on its preferences, the relevant con-
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gressional committees would have no incentive to waste precious legislative
resources to override the Court. Because the committees' indifference point
equals the Court's most preferred position, the committees would be
indifferent to the policy preferred by the Court.
In short, the strategic model suggests that the role of the Court in American
society is not simply a function of the preferences of the Court but of the other
relevant institutions as well. The Court-comprised of strategic "single-
minded seekers of legal policy"-prefers to avoid reaching decisions
considerably outside the range acceptable to the legislature and the president.
As strategic actors, the Justices realize that by acting outside of the acceptable
range, the law could end up farther away from the their ideal points than is
necessary.
Seen in this way, Dahl's thesis and our institutional theory accord in one
fundamental respect: the Court will not, in the main, issue decisions that are
unacceptable to the ruling regime. Where these two accounts differ is over the
mechanisms: Dahl argues that it is the nomination/confirmation process that
ensures the selection of Justices who agree with the preferences of the ruling
regime and the assumption of sincere behavior that guarantees that these
Justices will vote in accord with the preferences of contemporaneous actors.
31
We argue that the coupling of the Justices' desire to see their preferred policy
positions etched into law and the institution of separation of powers generates
the legitimizing effect.
B. Constitutional Versus Statutory Interpretation
Thus far, we have focused our attention on differences between the
implications of the two accounts for statutory interpretation. That we have
done so is no accident. Virtually all existing literature exploring the constraint
imposed on Justices by the separation of powers system asserts that the
constraint is far more---or, at the extreme, exclusively-operative in cases
calling for the Court to interpret a law rather than on cases asking the Court to
assess a law's constitutionality.32 The rationale behind this claim is straight-
31 See Dahi, supra note 1, at 284-85.
32 Exceptions, to lesser and greater extents, are EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 27; MURPHY, supra note
26; Louis Fisher, Congressional Checky on the Judiciary, in CONGRESS CONFROrs THE COURT: THE
STRUGGLE FOR LEGrrIACY AND AuTotorrY IN LAvMAKING 21 (Colton C. Campbell & John F. Stack Jr.
eds., 2001); James Meernik & Joseph Ignagni, Judicial Review and Coordinate Construction of the
Constitution, 41 AM. J. POL. Sm. 447 (1997); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of
Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369 (1992).
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forward. It is within Congress's power to overturn the interpretations the
Court gives to statutory law but, according to the Supreme Court, it is not-at
least not by a simple majority-within Congress's power to overturn the
Court's constitutional decisions; Congress must propose a constitutional
amendment.33  Given the infrequency with which Congress takes this step,
coupled with the frequency with which it disturbs the Court's statutory
interpretation decisions, 34 many scholars have argued that the Justices need not
be especially attentive (or, again at the extreme, not attentive at all) to the
preferences and likely actions of other government actors in constitutional
disputes.
Thus, is there any reason to suppose that the institutional account, as we
have developed here, applies to cases involving constitutional questions? This
is a critical question to ask, for the empirical test of Dahl's ruling regime thesis
rests exclusively on constitutional cases, specifically on a demonstration that
the Court does not often strike down legislation passed by contenporaneous
Congresses. If our theory is not applicable to constitutional cases, Tthen it is
Dahl who may offer the more plausible explanation, at least with regard to
constitutional disputes.
Conventional wisdom, as we note above, suggests as much but we take
issue with that wisdom. In fact, we might go so far as to argue that the Justices
feel more compelled in constitutional cases than in statutory ones to take into
account the preferences and likely actions of the relevant actors. This
argument-the contours of which we outline in Table 1-follows from a
consideration of the institutional costs and policy benefits of both types of
decisions.
33 The Court's most recent statements on this issue came in City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527
(1997) and Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
34 Between 1967 and 1990, Congress overrode 121 Court decisions. See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 22, at 344.
35 This would be the case if, in fact, Justices are free to ignore the preferences and likely actions of other
relevant actors in these disputes and vote in accord with their sincerely held preferences.
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Table 1. A Comparison of the Costs and Benefits to the Supreme
Court in Cases Involving Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation
36
Benefits Costs
(Assuming Congress/ (Assuming Congress/President responds
President does not adversely to a statutory decision by passing a
respond adversely to new law, and to a constitutional decision
the Court's decision) by attacking the Court)
Cost of
Cost of Unsuccessfid Successfid
Congressional Response Congressional
Response
Policy Benefit No policy
(Court reads its policy benefit accrues:
Court preferences into an potential harm
Interprets a existing law, though None to the legitimacy
Statute perhaps receives only a of the Court
transitory benefit)
Policy Benefit
Court (less transitory) and
Interprets Prescriptive Benefit Potential harm to the
The (Court prescribes legitimacy of the Court
Constitution standards for future
government action)
Let us begin with the benefits. If Congress does not (initially) respond
adversely to the Court's statutory interpretation, the Court accrues a policy
benefit; it is able to read its preferences into law and, perhaps, fundamentally
change the course of public policy. Such impact may be transitory, however,
because it is possible that future presidents and Congresses will amend the
statute in question to override the Court's interpretation. If Congress and the
36 We adapt this table from Andrew D. Martin, Strategic Decision Making and the Separation of Powers
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University) (on file with Dept. of Political Science,
Washington Univ. and with the authors).
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
president respond in this manner, they may render the Court's decision, and its
effect, meaningless. In contrast, owing to the difficulty of altering them both
in the short and long terms, constitutional decisions (at least those that fail to
generate a negative response from the relevant actors) are less permeable.
Accordingly, constitutional decisions have greater policy value to the Justices.
They also have prescriptive benefits that statutory decisions do not. When the
Court determines that a law is or is not constitutional, its decision does not
merely hold for the particular law under analysis but is binding on all future
action. Constitutional decisions set the parameters within which the
contemporaneous Congress and president-as well as their successors-must
act.
What costs do the Justices bear if the ruling regime has an adverse reaction
to their decision? If the president and Congress are unsuccessful in their
attempt to override an opinion interpreting a law, then no harm comes to the
Court. If, however, they succeed in overriding the Court's interpretation, the
Court will certainly pay a policy price. The Court's interpretation of the
statute no longer stands, thereby robbing the Court of the opportunity to affect
public policy. The Court also may bear a cost in terms of its legitimacy.
Every override of the Court's interpretation will chip away at its legitimacy
even if only marginally. Given that the Justices' ability to achieve their policy
goals hinges on their legitimacy, because they lack the power to enforce their
decisions, any erosion of the Court's legitimacy is a concern.
Let us now consider constitutional cases, and begin with a simple fact:
while Congress and the president may be unable to overturn these decisions
with ease, they have a number of weapons they can use to attack the Court.
Gerald Rosenberg outlines the following possibilities, all of which Congress,
the president, or both have attempted to deploy:
(1) [U]sing the Senate's confirmation power to select certain types of
judges; (2) enacting constitutional amendments to reverse decisions
or change Court structure or procedure; (3) impeachment; (4)
withdrawing Court jurisdiction over certain subjects; (5) altering the
selection and removal process; (6) requiring extraordinary majorities
for declarations of unconstitutionality; (7) allowing appeal from the
Supreme Court to a more "representative" tribunal; (8) removing the
power of judicial review; (9) slashing the budget; (10) altering the
size of the Court.
37
37 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 377 (emphasis removed); see also WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND
THE COURT 50-51, 57-63 (1962).
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In addition, and this is worthy of emphasis, however much the Justices have
stressed in recent cases they are the final arbiters of the Constitution,
38
Congress has attempted to respond to constitutional decisions in the form of
ordinary legislation. Louis Fisher makes this point saying, "If the Court
decides that a government action is unconstitutional, it is usually more difficult
for Congress and the president to contest the judiciary.... But even in this
category, there are examples of effective legislative and executive actions in
response to court rulings."39 Fisher provides a few illustrations, including an
1862 law prohibiting slavery in the territories that was designed to "repudiate
the main tenets4 0 of Dred Scott v. Sandford,41 and the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 outlawing child labor that the Supreme Court upheld in United
States v. Darby Lumber42 despite its earlier ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart.43
More generally, as James Meemik and Joseph Ignagni assert:
An examination of the frequency of reversal attempts and successes
reveals that contrary to popular and scholarly opinion, the Congress
can and does attempt to reverse Supreme Court rulings. Judicial
review does not appear to be equivalent to judicial finality.... [W]e
find that the Congress repeatedly voted to reinterpret the Constitution
after a High Court ruling of unconstitutionality. Although in 78% of
the cases (444 out of 569) where the Supreme Court ruled some
federal law, state law, or executive order unconstitutional, the
Congress made no attempt to reverse its ruling; on 125 occasions,
either the House or the Senate voted on legislation that would modify
such a ruling. While many scholars have argued in the past that for
all intents and purposes, judicial review is final, our results would
seem to indicate that Congress is willing to challenge the power of
the High Court.... [W]e find that in 33% of the cases (41 out of
125) where the Congress did attempt to reverse the Court's decision,
it was successful in passing legislation.
44
What does the ability of the ruling regime to attack constitutional court
decisions-through overrides or other means-imply in terms of the costs the
Justices bear? If an attack succeeds (and the Court does not back down), it
effectively removes the Court from the policy game and may seriously or, even
38 See supra note 33.
39 Fisher, supra note 32, at 28.
4o Id. at 29.
4' 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
42 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
4' 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by Darby, 312 U.S. at 115. Congress passed both the legislation at
issue in Hammer and the Fair Labor Standards Act under its power to regulate interstate commerce.
44 Meernik & Ignagni, supra note 32, at 458.
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irrevocably, harm its reputation, credibility, and legitimacy-thereby imposing
a potentially infinite cost on the institution. But even if the attempted attack is
unsuccessful, the integrity of the Court may be damaged, for the assault may
compromise its ability to make future constitutional decisions and, thus, more
long-lasting policy. We do not have to peer as far back as Dred Scott v.
Sandford to find examples; Bush v. Gore may provide one.45  The new
president and Congress did not attack it but other members of the government
did---of course, unsuccessfully at least in terms of the decision's impact. Yet
there seems little doubt that the critics (not to mention the decision itself)
caused some damage to reputation of the Court, the effects of which the
Justices may feel in the not-so-distant future.46
Taken collectively, we are left with the following picture: the benefits to
the Court of reaching a successful constitutional decision are roughly the same,
if not marginally greater, as those of reaching a successful statutory decision.
The costs of a challenge from members of the ruling regime, regardless of
whether that challenge is successful or not, are far greater. Seen in this way, it
seems to us quite reasonable to suppose that the institutional account is equally
applicable (and, again, perhaps even more so) to cases involving constitutional
and statutory questions. That is, if the Justices pay heed to the preferences and
likely actions of relevant external actors in statutory cases, then they have
good, if not better, reasons to do so in constitutional cases.
This leads us to following testable propositions. If our account applies to
constitutional cases, then we should expect to observe strategic behavior on the
part of the Justices. When the Justices hold preferences close to the ruling
regime, they will behave in a sincere fashion, that is, placing policy on their
most preferred position (see Figure la above). However, when they hold
preferences distant from the ruling regime, they will behave in a sophisticated
4' 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
46 For example, Democrats in the Senate have already suggested that President Bush's nominees to the
federal bench will face especially close scrutiny. Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking Democrat on the Senate
Judiciary Committee, said, "I think the closeness of the election and the ill will engendered by the Supreme
Court is going to make it difficult for the new administration to make some clear ideological stamp on the
courts." See Neil A. Lewis, Hurdles to Agenda: Democrats & Evenly Split Senate May Stall Bush on
Reshaping Courts, N.Y. TINEs, Jan. 2, 2001, at A10. Moreover, in a Gallup poll conducted on December 13,
2000, roughly one-third of those surveyed said that the Bush v. Gore decision led them to lose confidence in
the Supreme Court. In surveys conducted several days later (December 15-17), fifty percent responded, "yes,
influenced" to the following Gallup poll question: "Overall, do you think the Justices on the US Supreme
Court were influenced by their personal political views when deciding this case, or don't you think so?' See
Gallup Poll Organization, The Florida Recount Controversy from the Public's Perspective: 25 Insights (Dec.
22, 2000), available at http://www.gallup.com/pollreleases/Pr001222bii.asp.
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fashion, that is, placing policy not on their ideal point but rather on the point as
close as possible to their most preferred position that will not unleash a
congressional or presidential attack (in Figure lb, the committees' indifference
point). If, however, Dahl's ruling regime thesis applies to constitutional cases,
then we should observe the Justices always placing policy on their ideal point
regardless of how far that point may be from the most preferred positions of
relevant members of the ruling regime.
I. ASSESSING THE PROPOSITIONS
Assessment of these propositions required data to animate the dependent
variable, which is the vote of each Justice in cases involving a particular type
of policy. Further, we needed measures of and data on the independent
variables, the preferences of the Court, the president, and Congress over that
policy. We chose constitutional civil rights as the policy on which to focus our
inquiry because that area of the law has generated sufficient cases for
meaningful analysis and has served as an empirical reference point for work
concluding that the Justices engage in sophisticated behavior with regard to
other political actors when they interpret statutes. 47 Whether this holds true for
constitutional interpretation is a question of extreme interest here.
We obtained data on the Justices' votes and the direction of those votes
(liberal or conservative) in civil rights cases involving constitutional issues
from the Supreme Court Judicial Databases for the years 1953 to 1992.48 We
47 See generally Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 22;
Eslkridge, Reneging on History?: Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, supra note 22;
Spiller & Gely, supra note 27.
48 U.S. Supreme Court Databases, available at http:llwww.sse.msu.edu/-pls/pljp/sctdatal.html (last
modified Mar. 6, 2001). We used the following selection commands to generate the data for analysis:
keep if ANALU=. I ANALU=1 (each docket number included)
keep if VALUE-2 (civil rights)
keep if DECTYPE-1 I DECTYPE-2 I DECTYPE5 I DECTYPE=6 [
DEC_TYPE==7 (oral and signed opinion, per curiam, variant of formally
decided cases, judgment of the court)
keep if TERM>52 & TERM<92 (53 to 91 terms)
keep if AUTHDECI<3 (the primary authority for decision is constitutionality
of federal or state action)
Given the selection, the data set was expanded from the case being the unit of analysis to the vote being
the unit of analysis. Other measures were merged on to this new data set. These were matched by calendar
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measured the preferences of the median members of Congress and the
President with, respectively, Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE Common
Space Dimension One scores, which are estimated using roll call votes and
announced presidential vote intentions. 4  To assess the preferences of
Supreme Court Justices, we relied on scores created by Jeffrey A. Segal and
Albert D. Cover-scores that many scholars have invoked.50 To derive the
scores, the researchers content-analyzed newspaper editorials written between
the time of Justices' nominations to the Supreme Court and the Senate vote
over their confirmations. 51 Specifically:
[W]e trained three students to code each paragraph [in the editorial]
for political ideology. Paragraphs were coded as liberal, moderate,
conservative, or not applicable. Liberal statements include (but are
not limited to) those ascribing support for the rights of defendants in
criminal cases, women and racial minorities in equality cases, and the
individual against the government in privacy and First Amendment
cases. Conservative statements are those with an opposite direction.
Moderate statements include those that explicitly ascribe moderation
to the nominees or those that ascribe both liberal and conservative
values.5
2
They then measured judicial policy preferences by subtracting the fraction
of paragraphs coded conservative from the fraction of paragraphs coded liberal
and dividing by the total number of paragraphs coded liberal, conservative, and
moderate. 53  Their resulting scale of policy preferences ranges from -1
(unanimously conservative) to 0 (moderate) to +1 (unanimously liberal).54 For
purposes of presentation and analysis we have rescaled the scores from 0 (most
liberal) to 1 (most conservative). Table 2 displays the results.
year. Thus, the Congress and President measures from 1960 were matched to the 1959 term of the Court, and
so on.
49 See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POL1TICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL
CALL VOTING 11 (1997).
50 Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,
83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557 (1989); see, e.g., Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences,
40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 260 (1996); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Idealogical Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995).
51 Id. at 559.
52 Id.
53 See id.
54 Id.
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Table 2. Measuring the Policy Preferences of Supreme Court Justices
Serving between 1953 and 1992: The Segal-Cover Scores
55
Justice Segal-Cover Score
ft"= 0.000
0.000
1aka " 0.000
but" 0.000
JI4ana 0.125
i"" 
'"' .... 
25 0.125
0.250
W~rn 0.250
0.270
.:: 0.275
Wton 0.280
F0.335
Wmft 0.500
CU& 0.500
Whftah 0.500
O'connor 0.585
Keamdy 0.635
Sowa 0.670
Boa 0.720
sam 0.750
PoweD 0.835
Thon 0.840
B0.885
BWW 0.885
Rdawqni, 0.955
SCOW 1.000
55 The Segal-Cover values depicted here are from 0.000 (most liberal) to 1.000 (most conservative). For
the original Segal & Cover scores, see Segal & Cover, supra note 50, at 559-60.
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A. Baseline Results: Dahl's Assumption of Sincere Behavior
With the data now in hand, we assess the propositions above. We start by
examining the one that follows from Dahl's account; namely, that Justices
place policy on their ideal point regardless of how far that point may be from
the most preferred positions of relevant members of the ruling regime.
56
To appraise this, we simply compare the preferences of the Justices (as
measured by the Segal-Cover scores) and their votes in constitutional civil
rights cases, with Figure 3 displaying the results. If Dahl is correct, then we
should see the Justices (represented as circles in the figure) falling near the
curve imposed on the data, meaning that their sincere preferences (again, as
measured by the Segal-Cover scores) explain their votes in the cases. That
many are quite close suggests that Dahl's argument seems to rest on solid
ground. Indeed, the most conservative Justices vote conservatively 80% of the
time; that figure for liberals is 20%.
Figure 3. Scatterplot of Percent Conservative Votes in Constitutional
Civil Rights Cases on Justices' Preferences, 1953-199217
0
0
00
to
C05-' 
0 0 0
, 8 0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Segal I Cover Score
56 See Dahl, supra note 1, at 285 ("The fact is, then, that the policy views dominant on the Court are
never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the United
States.").
57 The Segal-Cover scores are rescaled from 0 to 1, with a high value representing a more conservative
Justice. A local regression ("loess") curve is imposed to illustrate the relationship between the two variables.
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B. Strategic Analysis
While this simple test seems to lend support to Dahl's assumption of
sincere behavior on the part of the Justices, the analysis cannot end there. That
is because our account also acknowledges the possibility of sincere behavior.
Recall that when the median Justice holds preference close to the ruling regime
the account predicts that she will place policy on her ideal point. It is only
when her preference is distant from the ruling regime that she will behave in a
sophisticated fashion, that is, placing policy not on the ruling regime's ideal
point but rather on the point as close as possible to her most preferred position
that will not unleash a congressional or presidential response.
To assess expectations generated by the strategic approach, we must
disaggregate judicial behavior and study it over time, under periods of liberal
and conservative regimes. We take two approaches. First, we consider the
votes of several individual Justices disaggregated by the president (a
reasonable surrogate, at least under Dahl's analysis, for the ruling regime).
Second, we explore the behavior of the Court as a whole disaggregated by the
president and Congress.
Let us begin with the individual Justices, two of whom we have chosen for
in-depth analysis-Justices Black and White.58  For both, we constructed
figures (Figures 4 and 5), which display the relationship between their votes in
constitutional civil rights cases by presidential administration. The points on
each of these plots represent the percentage of conservative votes cast, and the
error bars represent the 95% confidence interval. If two error bars do not
overlap, a statistically significant difference exists in voting between particular
presidencies. If an overlap occurs, no significant difference exists. Under the
strategic account, we should observe Justices Black and White voting in a
more conservative direction when a Republican is in the White House; under
Dahl's theory, we should observe no change in their behavior.
58 We constructed similar figures for all Justices who served under at least three presidents. For most of
the Justices, there is no statistically significant variation in their behavior, for some always voted their true
preferences because they were extremists or did not cast pivotal votes. Moreover, because the number of
constitutional civil rights cases are small, statistically significant differences are rare. The key test of the
mechanism is the conditional plots for the entire Court. See Figure 6, infra p. 608 and Figure 7, infra p. 608.
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Figure 4. Dot Plot of the Percentage of Conservative Constitutional Civil
Rights Votes Cast by Justice Black, Disaggregated by President59
Eisenhower
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
I I I I I I
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
% Conservative Constitutional Civil Rights Votes -- Black
59 In both Figures 4 and 5, the error bars depict the 95% confidence intervals of the percentage.
-6-
p
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Figure 5. Dot Plot of the Percentage of Conservative Constitutional Civil
Rights Votes Cast by Justice White, Disaggregated by President
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
Bush
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
% Conservative Constitutional Civil Rights Votes -- White
As Figures 4 and 5 reveal, the voting behavior of both Justice White and
Justice Black is characterized by sophisticated strategic decisionmaking. Note
that Justice Black was significantly more conservative in his voting during the
Nixon regime than he was during the more liberal Kennedy and Johnson
presidencies; Justice White was far more liberal when the two most liberal
presidents (at least during his tenure on the bench) were in office than he was
during the more conservative Nixon and Reagan presidencies. These patterns,
we believe, suggest strategic adaptation, and precisely the sort of adaptation we
would anticipate if Justices behave in a sophisticated fashion with regard to the
ruling regime: altering their decisions to reflect the preferences of that regime.
It is precisely the adaptation we would not expect to observe if Dahl's
assumption of sincere behavior rested on a firm empirical basis.
Do these same results hold at the Court level? To address this question, we
constructed two plots (Figures 6 and 7), both of which illustrate the relation-
ship between voting in constitutional civil rights cases and preferences.
-0-
-6--
p
-0--
p
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However, the two charts condition that relationship differentially. Figure 6
conditions it on presidential preferences, whether conservative, moderate, or
liberal while Figure 7 conditions it on Senate preferences, again whether
conservative, liberal, or moderate.
Figure 6. Scatterplots of the Percentage of Conservative Votes in
Constitutional Civil Rights Cases on Justices' Preferences, Conditioned on
the Preferences of the President60
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Segal / Cover Score
60 The upper cell contains data from conservative presidents, as measured by common space Nominate
scores, the middle cell, from moderate presidents, and the lower cell from liberal presidents. See POOLE &
ROSENTHAL, supra note 49. In each cell, a local regression ("loess") curve is imposed to illustrate the
relationship between the variables.
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Figure 7. Scatterplots of the Percentage of Conservative Votes in
Constitutional Civil Rights Cases on Justices' Preferences, Conditioned on
the Median Member of the Senate
61
i .
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Segal / Cover Score
conservative ,"
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0 0
0 0 o 8 o
00 0 0 0
00 0 0 0
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00 O00 0Y 0
0 oo0/
0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0
Liberal
0 0 0
0 0 00
61 The upper cell contains data from conservative Senates, as measured by NOMINATE common space
dimension one scores, the middle cell, from moderate Senates, and the lower cell from liberal Senates. Id. In
each cell, a loess curve is imposed to illustrate the relationship between the variables.
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The plots differ, of course, but they tend to tell a similar story. First, strong
ideologues on the Court (those with Segal-Cover scores close to 0 or 1) vote in
accord with their preferences regardless of the preferences of the ruling
regime. This supports Dahl's assumption, but moderate Justices do not behave
in this way. In Figure 5, the local regression ("loess") curve shows that those
with middle-range Segal-Cover scores are more likely to vote conservatively
when there is a moderate or conservative president. The preferences of the
Senate also seem to affect these Justices, with voting taking a decisively more
conservative turn when the Senate is right of center.
IV. DISCUSSION
We interpret these tests as lending support both to Dahl's "ruling regime"
thesis and our institutional approach to resolving the "countermajoritiarian
difficulty." Both accounts predict that Justices will vote their sincere
preferences when they hold preferences similar to those of the members of the
other branches of government. The empirical evidence indicates that this
generally occurs. The empirical evidence also demonstrates sophisticated
decisionmaking in which the Justices deviate from their personal preferences
when those preferences are not shared by the members of the ruling regime.
Tests at both the individual and the aggregate levels support the proposition
that the Justices adjust their decisions in anticipation of the potential responses
of the other branches of government. This behavior is consistent with our
institutional approach, but Dahl's analysis cannot account for it.
We believe these results are consequential, for they carry with them im-
plications bearing on normative questions raised by the "countermajoritiarian
difficulty." The "difficulty" is, of course, embedded in a complex scheme for
constitutional democracy. Under this scheme, we want the Court to safeguard
the constitutionally protected rules of the democratic game while avoiding
interventions that thwart the constitutionally legitimate actions of the majority.
Dahl argued that the latter is not particularly problematic because of the
correspondence of preferences between the members of the Court and the
elected ruling regime.62  This, however, raises an alternative normative
problem for Dali: If the ruling regime hypothesis holds, with how much
confidence can we rely on the Court to check the majority's attempts to violate
the rules of the game?
62 Dahl, supra note 1, at 285.
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We argue, in contrast, that the separation of powers scheme created by the
Founders established an institutional interdependence among the branches that
allows for the possibility that the Court might be a protector of the rules of the
game without producing a substantial countermajoritarian effect. This
institutional structure anticipates the possibility of differences in preferences,
thereby producing a check on elected officials, but also creates institutional
incentives to diminish the antidemocratic effects of those differences. We
believe significant evidence exists to support the claim that it is the
institutional constraints embedded in our basic constitutional scheme that
should actually diminish the anxieties generated by the "countermajoritarian
difficulty."
Seen in this way, Dahl was justified in discounting concerns about the
"countermajoritarian difficulty," but he did not offer the most compelling
justification for his position. Dahl rested his argument on the related claims
that presidents select Supreme Court Justices who share their preferences and
those Justices will subsequently vote in accordance with those preferences.
63
We present no evidence with regard to the first claim but it is certainly the case
that history is replete with anecdotal evidence indicating that presidents
occasionally make "mistakes" in their choice of judicial nominees. Our
statistical evidence, as well as a growing body of related research, challenges
the simplicity of the second claim. As an alternative resolution of the
"difficulty," we offer an institutional account that is weaker in its assumptions
and more comprehensive in its approach. Unlike Dahl's account, it does not
depend on an empirical assertion about the substantive content of judicial
preferences. Ours is grounded instead in the stability of the institutional
scheme instantiated in the Constitution, and it rests merely on the claim that
Justices care about the nature and content of the law and that they wil adopt
the most effective means to influence it.
63 Id. at 284-85.
